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Abstract
This study investigates Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 firms in the post-Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) period (2011-2014) to examine how listed firms follow the non-
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) earnings reporting guidelines issued by ASIC to
communicate underlying earnings reporting quality. We find that firms that do not comply with the ASIC
guidelines have lower underlying earnings reporting quality than do firms that comply with these guidelines.
Firms that do not follow the ASIC guidelines are found to exclude income-increasing underlying earnings
adjustments to make underlying earnings appear more profitable than IFRS earnings when they miss earnings
targets or make current losses, and that they report underlying earnings opportunistically by excluding
recurring expenses that persist into future operating earnings. Unlike ASIC non-compliance firms, ASIC
compliance firms attempt to act as responsible reporters by reporting underlying earnings in a responsible
manner to demonstrate a judicious use of discretion in informing shareholders. Further, we find that
underlying earnings reported by non-compliance firms are less value-relevant than underlying earnings
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This study uses data on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 firms for 2011–2014 
to examine the impacts of Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
non–International Financial Reporting Standards (non–IFRS) earnings reporting 
guidelines on non-IFRS earnings reporting quality. We find that firms that do not 
comply with the ASIC guidelines have lower non–IFRS earnings reporting quality than 
do firms that comply with these guidelines. The former firms opportunistically exclude 
recurring expenses from IFRS earnings to ensure non–IFRS earnings appear more 
profitable than IFRS earnings when they miss earnings targets or incur current losses. 
The latter firms act as responsible reporters by judiciously using their discretion to 
efficiently report non-IFRS earnings. The findings indicate that although ASIC has 
issued guidelines to limit firms’ opportunistic non–IFRS earnings reporting, but 
opportunistic non–IFRS earnings reporting is still present in non–compliance firms. We 
suggest mandatorily enforcing the guidelines on non–IFRS earnings reporting firms to 
mitigate such opportunistic reporting. Where possible, ASIC should increase its 
enforcement action against firms that do not comply with these guidelines. 
 
Keywords: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, earnings target, 
earnings losses, earnings adjustments, non-IFRS earnings, reporting quality, value 
relevance 
JEL Classification: M41 Accounting  
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1. Introduction  
In recent decades, reporting non-International Financial Reporting Standards 
(non-IFRS) earnings has become a common practice in countries worldwide. This 
began in the 1990s in the United States (US) and spread worldwide (Bhattacharya et al., 
2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003). Non-IFRS earnings, commonly 
known as non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (non-GAAP) earnings, 
reported by managers in the US, provide alternate and unaudited earnings measures of 
firm performance. Non-GAAP earnings are also referred to as “recurring earnings,” 
“core earnings,” “pro forma earnings,” “underlying earnings”, and “adjusted earnings.” 
Non-GAAP earnings represent recurring cash-related earnings and exclude non-
recurring and non-cash items. Firms argue that non-recurring and non-cash items do not 
reflect monetarily measured underlying firm performance (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2004). Managers consider that non-
GAAP earnings can help investors make better decisions because such earnings 
provide information on firms’ recurring economic performance (Albring et al., 2010; 
Collins et al., 2009). Non-GAAP earnings reported by firms have received considerable 
research attention, with some researchers finding that non-GAAP earnings help 
investors improve decision-making because of the availability of more accurate 
information on firm performance (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Sloan, 
2002; Collins et al., 2009; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003), while others find that non-
GAAP earnings do not improve investors’ decision-making because managers’ report 
non-GAAP earnings to obtain personal economic benefits (e.g., meeting set earnings 
targets) or to unduly influence investors’ perceptions about firm performance (e.g., 
Doyle et al., 2003; Johnson and Schwartz, 2005; Black and Christensen, 2009).  
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This paper considers that “non-IFRS earnings” which are similar to the non-
GAAP earnings reported in the US. Non-IFRS earnings and non-GAAP earnings are 
calculated by preparers using their judgment to reflect “core” or “recurring” business 
activities of the reporting firm. Both types of earnings are voluntarily reported, and 
calculated by adjusting statutory earnings.  
However, from a reporting and regulatory perspective, non-IFRS earnings and 
non-GAAP earnings differ in two ways. First, the adjustment items excluded from non-
GAAP earnings reported by US firms differ from the adjustment items excluded from 
non-IFRS earnings reported by Australian firms. US firms use several common 
adjustment items: stock-based compensation costs, tax and interest effects, merger and 
acquisition costs, expensed research and development costs, depreciation and 
amortization costs, and gains and losses on asset dispositions (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Black and Christensen, 2009). The common adjustment items 
made to non-IFRS earnings by Australian firms are impairment and/or revaluation of 
assets, losses and/or gains on disposal of assets and business, and restructuring costs 
(Deloitte, 2010; KPMG, 2009).  
Second, unlike in the US, 1  there is no compulsory regulation governing 
managers’ reporting on non–IFRS earnings in Australian firms. The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued Consultation Paper  150 in 
March 2011, proposing guidelines to minimize any adverse effect that may result from 
firms reporting non-IFRS earnings. The guidelines state the following: (i) managers 
																																																								
1The SEC introduced Regulation G (Reg G), item 10(e) of Regulation S-K, and item 12 to govern non-GAAP 
earnings reported outside financial statements in 2003. Reg G includes all the public reporting of non-GAAP 
financial evaluation containing conference calls, press releases, presentations to investors, and other forms of media. 
In order to establish transparency in calculating non-GAAP earnings,  the regulation demands that the reporters 
reconcile non-GAAP earnings with GAAP earnings. While the SEC attempts to ensure non-GAAP earnings reporting 
is useful and has not been completed in a misguided manner, it does not prohibit non-GAAP reporting (SEC, 2003). 
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should explain the calculation of non-IFRS earnings and why it is important to report 
them; (ii) firms should not provide greater prominence to non-IFRS earnings than to 
IFRS information; (iii) managers should provide a reconciliation between non-IFRS 
earnings and IFRS earnings; and (iv) firms should consistently report non-IFRS 
earnings (ASIC, 2011a). In December 2011, ASIC published its Regulatory Guide 230: 
Disclosing Non-IFRS Financial Information as a guide to clarify reporting of non-IFRS 
earnings, with the aim of preventing the users being misguided by non-IFRS earnings 
reporting. ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 230 states that firms can report non-IFRS earnings 
in communications such as directors’ reports, press releases, notes to financial 
statements, and analyst briefings, but that reporting should not mislead financial-
statement users by giving greater prominence to non-IFRS earnings than IFRS earnings 
information. Firms can report non-IFRS earnings when that reporting assists in 
providing a true and fair view of financial statements. Firms must also reconcile non-
IFRS earnings and IFRS earnings by showing and explaining adjustments (ASIC, 
2011b). These guidelines are similar to Reg G in the US; however, it is mandatory for 
firms that report non-GAAP earnings to follow Reg G but it is voluntary for firms that 
report non-IFRS earnings to follows ASIC’s guidelines. The differences in adjustment 
items and regulatory requirements between Australian and US firms mean that Australia 
allows a setting for the investigation of the role of reporting non-IFRS earnings in the 
context of a voluntary-reporting environment shaped by ASIC guidelines.  
This study examines how Australian listed firms follow the non-IFRS earnings 
reporting guidelines issued by ASIC in 2011 to report non-IFRS earnings. We examine 
the non-IFRS earnings reporting quality of firms that comply or do not comply with the 
ASIC guidelines in the post-ASIC period. We also examine the value relevance of the 
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non-IFRS earnings reporting for ASIC non-compliance firms and ASIC compliance 
firms in the post-ASIC period. This study selected ASX 200 firms as they represent the 
principal investment benchmark in Australia and examined from years 2011 to 2014.  
             The results show that firms that do not comply with the ASIC guidelines 
opportunistically exclude recurring expenses when those firms miss earnings targets or 
make current losses. In contrast, firms that comply with the ASIC guidelines tend to 
report non-IFRS earnings efficiently. Specifically, non-IFRS earnings adjustments made 
by compliance firms do not persist into future operating earnings, indicating that ASIC 
compliance firms tend to act as responsible reporters. The results suggest that firms that 
do not voluntarily follow ASIC’s non-IFRS reporting guidelines have lower non-IFRS 
earnings reporting quality than firms that follow the guidelines. In addition, we find that 
the market perceives the non-IFRS earnings reported by non–compliance firms to be 
more value relevant than such earnings reported by compliance firms when the former 
firms use income-increasing exclusions to report higher non-IFRS earnings than IFRS 
earnings to meet IFRS earnings targets and avoid IFRS losses. This finding suggests 
that for non–compliance firms, the value relevance of non-IFRS earnings derives from 
managers’ opportunistic behavior of excluding income-increasing non–IFRS earnings 
adjustments, and investors are misled. 
 
This paper makes two significant contributions. First, prior research in the US 
provides mixed results about managers’ motivations to report non-GAAP earnings in 
the context of mandatory reporting guidelines. Such motivations are not examined in the 
context of voluntary reporting guidelines. To the best of our knowledge, this study is an 
early contributor to the literature on voluntary reporting in its investigation of the non-
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IFRS earnings reporting quality of firms that voluntarily comply or do not comply with 
ASIC guidelines. Second, this study contributes empirical evidence to the literature on 
non-IFRS earnings reporting by examining the types of expense adjustments made to 
IFRS earnings to determine non-IFRS earnings by firms that comply with or firms that 
do not comply with the voluntary ASIC guidelines.  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 
examines the relevant literature and presents the hypotheses developed in this study. 
Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the data analyses and 
regression results. Section 5 presents the additional tests. Section 6 presents the study 
conclusions. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1. Motivations for Non-GAAP Earnings Reporting  
Studies have examined whether managerial discretion in reporting non-GAAP 
earnings helps investors to ascertain more accurately the underlying economic reality of 
the firm (efficient reporting motivation) or perpetuates managers’ interests 
(opportunistic reporting motivation). This paper provides evidence from the empirical 
studies conducted that reveal the presence of both types of reporting motivation.  
2.1.1. Evidence of efficient reporting motivation  
A range of arguments highlight the potential benefits of non-GAAP earnings 
reporting made by managers. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) compared the value relevance 
of non-GAAP earnings with the value relevance of GAAP earnings. These authors first 
demonstrated that a substantial portion of exclusions from non-GAAP earnings are non-
recurring expenses. The research found that the earnings response coefficients and 
regression R2 were much higher for non-GAAP earnings than for GAAP earnings, 
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suggesting that investors perceive non-GAAP earnings as more relevant. Brown and 
Sivakumar (2003) extended Bradshaw and Sloan’s (2002) study by investigating three 
qualitative attributes of non-GAAP earnings for value relevance: the capacity to forecast 
future earnings with stock prices (predictive ability); correlating earnings with stock 
prices (valuation); and associating earnings with abnormal stock returns (information 
content). The authors found that non-GAAP earnings is a better measure of predictive 
ability, valuation, and information content than GAAP earnings. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) investigated whether non-GAAP earnings reported by managers are more 
persistent and informative than GAAP operating earnings, finding that non-GAAP 
earnings are much more informative and persistent than GAAP operating earnings, 
implying that market participants consider that non-GAAP earnings represent “core 
earnings” better than GAAP earnings. Collins et al. (2009) used abnormal-returns 
volatility, abnormal returns, and abnormal trading volume around quarterly-earnings 
announcement dates to examine the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings. The 
authors found that market participants increasingly rely on non-GAAP earnings for their 
stock-pricing decisions. Albring et al. (2010) examined whether reported non-GAAP 
earnings are more relevant than GAAP earnings, using the stock-prices model and 
stock-returns model. The results demonstrated that non-GAAP earnings are strongly 
associated with stock prices and stock returns, suggesting that non-GAAP earnings are 
more relevant to investors than are GAAP earnings. Choi et al. (2007) investigated the 
specific sources of disagreement between analysts and management in relation to the 
components of non-GAAP earnings in the United Kingdom (UK) context. They found 
that most management-specific adjustments made in non-GAAP earnings are non-
recurring items, and are more useful for increasing the persistence aspect of non-GAAP 
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earnings than are specific adjustments made by analysts. These results suggest that 
management-specific adjustments to GAAP earnings reveal managers’ superior 
knowledge of the persistence aspect of earnings components.  
2.1.2. Evidence of opportunistic reporting motivation 
In contrast, studies have also found evidence that managers opportunistically 
report non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings cannot meet earnings thresholds. 
Managers’ report non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat GAAP earnings targets by 
excluding recurring-earnings components from GAAP earnings. Doyle et al. (2003) 
investigated persistent exclusions made by managers when calculating non-GAAP 
earnings and discovered that the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings in calculating 
non-GAAP earnings are value relevant to future earnings, suggesting that non-GAAP 
earnings are manipulated by managers. Johnson and Schwartz (2005) employed a 
between-samples design to compare the characteristics of firms that report non-GAAP 
earnings and those that do not, and found no difference in the persistence in GAAP 
earnings per share (EPS) of firms that report non-GAAP earnings and those that do not 
report such earnings. The narrow-window stock-returns tests revealed no evidence of a 
stock-returns premium for firms reporting non-GAAP earnings at the quarterly-earnings 
announcement date. Although investors were not misled by non-GAAP earnings 
reporting, the authors question managers’ assertions that reporting non-GAAP earnings 
is intended to help investors assess firm performance. Landsman et al. (2007) examined 
the components of earnings that are excluded from GAAP earnings to reach non-GAAP 
earnings to determine the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings. The authors 
employed three quality attributes in their study: abnormal earnings forecasting, 
predictability of exclusions, and valuation of exclusions. The findings demonstrated that 
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the market misprices manager-led positive and negative exclusions, special items, and 
other types of exclusions made in non-GAAP earnings reporting, suggesting that 
managers mislead the market through a non-GAAP reporting strategy. Black and 
Christensen (2009) studied the adjustments that managers make in reporting non-GAAP 
earnings, and discovered that managers exclude recurring items from GAAP earnings to 
define non-GAAP earnings to meet strategic earnings targets. Elshafie et al. (2010) 
investigated the relationship between investor-perception management achieved through 
reporting non-GAAP earnings opportunistically and real-activities earnings 
management or accruals earnings management. Their research found that managers tend 
to report non-GAAP earnings opportunistically if they do not meet their earnings targets 
or if they have limited ability in managing earnings through two other earnings-
management techniques (i.e., real-activities earnings management and accruals earnings 
management). Barth et al. (2012) examined the differences in recognizing stock-based 
compensation expenses when managers calculate non-GAAP earnings and analysts also 
calculate and report street earnings to understand whether managers’ incentives to 
report non-GAAP earnings differ from analysts’ street earnings. They found that 
managers exclude stock-based compensation expenses from their non-GAAP earnings 
calculations to increase the non-GAAP earnings they report. These managers were 
found to report smoothed earnings across reporting periods, and meet earnings 
benchmarks when GAAP earnings did not. This opportunistic motivation was also 
found to exist in analysts’ street-earnings reporting. Analysts are motivated to manage 
investor perceptions of the performance of the firms they follow, suggesting that 
analysts curry favor with managers. 
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Opportunistic non-GAAP earnings reporting behavior also exists outside the US 
such as in European countries. For example, Hitz (2010) investigated the determinants 
of firms’ decisions to report non-GAAP earnings in a largely unregulated setting in the 
German capital market and discovered that firms emphasize non-GAAP earnings more 
than GAAP earnings. Hitz (2010) found that firms that do not meet earnings 
benchmarks under GAAP earnings are much more likely to report non-GAAP earnings 
than firms that meet or beat these benchmarks under GAAP earnings. In addition, Isidro 
and Marques (2014) used hand-collected data for a sample of large European firms to 
study the effect of economic factors and countries’ institutional structure on managers’ 
non-GAAP earnings reporting. They found that countries with efficient legislative 
systems that provide strong protection for investors with a developed capital market, 
and with sound communicational channels tend to utilize non-GAAP reporting to meet 
or beat earnings targets.  
2.2. Regulatory Response to Non-GAAP Earnings  
Various empirical studies have examined the influences of regulation on non-
GAAP earnings reporting, with some findings demonstrating that Reg G in the US has 
resulted in a decline in the non-GAAP earnings reported. For example, Marques (2006) 
documented that the average percentage of firms that report non-GAAP earnings 
decreased after the introduction of Reg G. According to Heflin and Hsu (2008), not only 
did the frequency of non-GAAP earnings reporting decrease, but also the number of 
exclusions showing discrepancies between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings decreased. 
However, this declining trend reversed to an upward trend in 2012 in the US (Black et 
al., 2012). After the introduction of Reg G, studies found that the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings reported increased. The quality of such reporting has several dimensions. 
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Firms reported less opportunistic non-GAAP measures (Bowen et al, 2005). Potentially 
misleading reporting practices also decreased (Entwistle et al., 2006). Confidence in the 
market increased (Marques, 2006). The probability that firms disclose non-GAAP 
earnings to meet or beat forecasts declined (Heflin and Hsu, 2008). Firms restrained 
from mispricing (Zhang and Zheng, 2011).  
2.3. Hypothesis Development  
The literature has documented that when firms miss earnings targets, they tend 
to report non-GAAP earnings (which is equivalent to non-IFRS earnings in Australia) 
aggressively (i.e., the non-GAAP earnings is reported higher than GAAP earnings) to 
meet earnings targets or to avoid earnings losses (e.g., Elshafie et al., 2010; Hitz, 2010). 
First, this study attempts to examine whether non-compliance firms tend to report non-
IFRS earnings aggressively by excluding income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments from IFRS earnings, when they miss earnings targets or make IFRS losses 
compared with compliance firms. Given that this paper is the first to examine the non-
IFRS earnings reporting quality of firms that voluntary comply or do not comply with 
the ASIC guidelines, and that non-GAAP reporting shows mixed evidence in a 
regulatory compliance environment, this paper states hypothesis 1 in null form as 
follows:  
H1: There is no difference in the income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments made by ASIC compliance firms and ASIC non-compliance firms, 
when firms miss earnings targets or make losses.   
Secondly, this study attempts to investigate whether aggressive non-IFRS 
earnings is reported by managers opportunistically. Opportunistic non-IFRS earnings 
reporting is perceived as a less costly earnings-management technique because it is less 
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likely to be detected by investors than other earnings-management techniques. From a 
valuation perspective, if the probability of detecting an earnings-management technique 
is low, it is less costly than other earnings-management techniques (Badertscher et al., 
2012). Opportunistic non-IFRS earnings reporting is much easier to process than trying 
to identify whether a firm has engaged in real or accruals-based earnings management 
(Black et al., 2017). Another advantage of opportunistic non-IFRS earnings reporting is 
that it enables management to manage earnings in large amounts without accounting for 
the adjustments in the accounting-information system because this adjustment 
information is used for reporting purposes only, which enables management to achieve 
specific reporting benchmarks (Black et al., 2017; Badertscher, 2011). 
The literature describes opportunistic non-IFRS earnings reporting as a situation 
where if non-IFRS earnings adjustments contain recurring expenses that persist into 
future operating earnings, these recurring expenses, which are persistent from one 
reporting period to another, will be realized in future operating earnings (e.g., Doyle et 
al., 2003; Frankel et al., 2011). This paper examines the persistence of income-
increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments for reporting firms that comply or do not 
comply with the ASIC guidelines. Given that no study has examined how firms follow 
the ASIC guidelines to report income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments, the 
second hypothesis in this paper is stated in two parts to establish the total situation and 
reporting situations by individual adjustments, as follows: 
H2a: There is no difference in the persistence of total income-increasing non-
IFRS earnings adjustments between ASIC compliance firms and ASIC non-
compliance firms.  
H2b: There is no difference in the persistence of individual income-increasing 
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non-IFRS earnings adjustments between ASIC compliance firms and ASIC non-
compliance firms.  
To date, empirical evidence does not provide clear evidence on the value 
relevance of non-GAAP earnings. A stream of evidence demonstrates that non-GAAP 
earnings are value relevant to the market (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and 
Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003). However, there is also evidence to 
demonstrate that the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings results from managers 
opportunistically excluding recurring adjustments from GAAP earnings (e.g., Doyle et 
al., 2003; Frankel et al., 2011). These findings on non-GAAP earnings relate to a 
reporting period under a mandatory reporting regime; however, the present study tests 
market responses in a context of voluntary statutory intervention. Given that the value 
relevance of non-IFRS earnings is an open and testable question, the influence of 
ASIC’s guidelines on value-relevant non-IFRS earnings is yet unspecified. This paper 
states the value-relevance hypothesis in null form as follows:  
H3: There is no difference in the value relevance of non-IFRS earnings between 
ASIC compliance firms and ASIC non-compliance firms. 
3. Research Design  
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
This study focuses on the post-ASIC period and uses ASX 200 firms from years 
2011 to 2014 as the sample frame. ASX 200 firms were selected as the sample frame 
because the ASX 200 is recognized as the primary investment benchmark in Australia, 
and ASX 200 firms cover approximately 78% of Australian equity market 
capitalization. The financial data were collected from the DatAnalysis database. We 
hand collected the non-IFRS earnings data from the annual reports of ASX 200 firms. 
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Following Dahmash et al. (2009), we excluded firms involved in banking, insurance, 
diversified financials, and real estate because they are subject to different reporting 
requirements.  
To collect the non-IFRS earnings data, we searched for information on non-
IFRS earnings reported in the annual reports that are available in the Annual Reports 
Online database and DatAnalysis database by typing the keywords “underlying”, 
“adjusted”, “normalized”, “non-IFRS”, “earnings before”, “profit before”, and “pro 
forma”. Following Black and Christensen (2009), we excluded earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) and earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) because these earnings are commonly reported as standard steps in the 
income statement. If a firm complies with all of ASIC’s guidelines—(i) firms explain 
the calculation of non-IFRS earnings and why it is important to report them; (ii) firms 
do not provide greater prominence to non-IFRS earnings than to IFRS earnings, (iii) 
firms provide a reconciliation between non-IFRS earnings and IFRS earnings, (i v) 
firms consistently report non-IFRS earnings (ASIC, 2011a, 2011b)—over the four 
reporting periods from 2011 to 2014, then the study consider the firm a compliance 
firm.  
Table 1 presents the sample-selection process in detail. The study found 131 of 
152 firms had reported non-IFRS earnings at least once during the study period (2011–
2014). In total, 407 firm-year observations of 608 firm-year observations in the sample 
disclosed non-IFRS earnings. Forty-six firms, which account for 184 firm-year 
observations, disclosed non-IFRS earnings that comply with ASIC guidelines over four 
observation years. Eighty-five firms (i.e., 131 minus 46), and 223 firm-year 
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observations (i.e., 407 minus 184) reported non-IFRS earnings that do not comply with 
ASIC guidelines.   
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
3.2. Earnings Target, Earnings Losses, and Non-IFRS earnings Adjustments (H1) 
Following Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Elshafie et al. (2010), this paper 
used previous-year earnings before tax at the end of the financial year as a proxy for 
earnings target. Firms that generated earnings before tax at the end of the current 
financial year that were less than the earnings before tax of the previous financial year 
were considered to represent managers that have missed their earnings targets (Missj,t), 
such firms were coded 1, and zero otherwise. This paper defines Lossj,t as a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if firm j made IFRS losses in year t, and zero otherwise.  
The empirical models for testing H1 are designed as follows:  
ADJj,t=a0+a1Missj,t + a2Lossj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4Missj,t*NCPLj,t + a5Lossj,t*NCPLj,t 
+a6Controlsj,t +ej,t                                                                                                   (1) 
Where j is firm-year observations, and t is years from 2011 to 2014. ADJj,t is the total 
actual income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments divided by the number of 
shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. It is calculated as the actual non-IFRS earnings 
figures minus the IFRS earnings figures divided by the number of shares outstanding 
for firm j, in year t. We keep positive ADJj,t and set negative ADJj,t as 0 because we 
focus only on income-increasing adjustments. Missj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if firm j’s earnings before tax in year t are less than earnings before tax in year t-1, and 
zero otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j made IFRS losses in 
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year t, and zero otherwise. NCPLj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j does not 
comply with ASIC guidelines to report non-IFRS earnings in year t, or 0 otherwise. 
Missj,t*NCPLj,t is the interaction term between Missj,t and NCPLj,t. Lossj,t*NCPLj,t is the 
interaction term between Lossj,t and NCPLj,t. Control variables are discussed in Section 
3.4. 
3.3. Persistence of Income-increasing Non-IFRS earnings Adjustments (H2) 
Doyle et al. (2003) found that adjustments to GAAP-based earnings made by 
managers are not entirely transitory because current recurring items are realized in 
future cash flows. Frankel et al. (2011) also confirmed this. However, both studies 
examined the persistence of total non-GAAP exclusions measured as non-GAAP EPS 
minus GAAP EPS. Kolev et al. (2008) found non-GAAP adjustments to be of higher 
quality following intervention by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
non-GAAP earnings. Further, these authors found that firms that stopped reporting non-
GAAP earnings after intervention by the SEC had lower quality adjustments in the pre-
intervention period. In those studies, the total non-GAAP exclusions include income-
decreasing and income-increasing exclusions. In contrast, this paper considers that 
when firms miss the IFRS earnings targets or make IFRS earnings losses, they tend to 
use income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments to make their report more 
favorable than if they reported only IFRS earnings. This paper not only examines the 
persistence of total income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments but also extends 
previous literature by examining the persistence of individual income-increasing non-
IFRS earnings adjustments. If income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments are 
presented faithfully by managers, and that is where income-increasing adjustments are 
deemed as value irrelevant, then those adjustments should not relate to future operating 
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earnings. However, if income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments include 
information that is useful for future earnings, then there is a relationship between future 
operating earnings and income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments because these 
adjustments are realized in future years. The empirical models for testing H2a and H2b 
are presented below. 
Test for H2a 
OEj,t+1 =a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t * NCPLj,t + a5Controlsj,t 
+ vj,t                                                                                                                   (2a i) 
OEj,t+1 =a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t * NCPLj,t  + a5Missj,t + 
a6ADJj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t + a7Controlsj,t + vj,t                                                    (2a ii) 
OEj,t+1 =a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t * NCPLj,t  + a5Lossj,t + 
a6ADJj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t + a7Controlsj,t + vj,t                                                    (2a iii) 
OEj,∑t+1to2 =a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t*NCPLj,t +a5Controlsj,t 
+ vj,t                                                                                                                  (2a iv) 
OEj,∑t+1to2 =a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t * NCPLj,t  + a5Missj,t + 
a6ADJj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t + a7Controlsj,t + vj,t                                                    (2a v) 
OEj,∑t+1to2=a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2ADJj,t + a3NCPLj,t + a4ADJj,t * NCPLj,t  + a5Lossj,t + 
a6ADJj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t + a7Controlsj,t + vj,t                                                    (2a vi) 
This paper tests the H2b using two sub-samples (i.e., ASIC compliance firms 
versus ASIC non-compliance firms) applying the following two equations: 
OEj,t+1 = a0 +a1UEPSj,t+a2IndADJj,t+a3Controlsj,t+vj,t                                      (2b i) 
OEj,∑t+1to2=a0+a1UEPSj,t+a2IndADJj,t+a3Controlsj,t+vj,t                                                    (2b ii) 
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Where j is firm-year observations, and t is years from 2011 to 2014. OEj,t+1 is the one-
year-ahead operating earnings2 and OEj,∑t+1to2 is the sum of two-years-ahead operating 
earnings, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t. UEPSj,t is the actual non-IFRS 
earnings figures that firms report divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm j, 
in year t. NCPLj,t is the dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j does not comply with 
ASIC guidelines to report non-IFRS earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. ADJj,t is the 
total actual income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments divided by the number of 
shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. It is calculated as the actual non-IFRS earnings 
figures minus the IFRS earnings figures divided by the number of shares outstanding 
for firm j, in year t. We keep positive ADJj,t and set negative ADJj,t as 0. ADJj,t*NCPLj,t 
is the interaction term between ADJj,t and NCPLj,t. Missj,t is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if firm j’s earnings before tax in year t are less than earnings before tax in year 
t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j made IFRS 
losses in year t, and zero otherwise. ADJj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t is the interaction term 
between ADJj,t, Missj,t, and NCPLj,t. ADJj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t is the interaction term 
between ADJj,t, Lossj,t,and NCPLj,t. 
IndADJj,t represents eight individual income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments (i.e. different expenses) that are excluded by managers. The eight 
individual adjustments are presented here. IAj,t is the actual impairment of assets figures 
divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do 
not exclude impairment of assets, coded as 0. LAj,t is the actual losses on asset 
																																																								
2	Doyle et al. (2003) use future cash flows as dependent variables. However, this dependent variable is less accurate 
in evaluating the persistence of adjustments because current liabilities have implications for future cash flows (Kolev 
et al., 2008). Future earnings before tax as a dependent variable is also less desirable because earnings before tax 
often includes expenses that are excluded from non-GAAP profit, resulting in a systematic relationship that does not 
reflect opportunism (Frankel et al., 2011).    
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dispositions or investment figures divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm 
j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude losses on asset dispositions or 
investments, coded as 0. RCj,t is the actual redundancies and/or restructuring costs 
divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do 
not exclude redundancies or restructuring costs, coded as 0. MACj,t is the actual asset 
merge or demerge and acquisition-transaction costs divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those that firms do not exclude asset merge or 
demerge and acquisition-transaction costs, coded as 0. TIj,t is the actual figures of 
expenses related to tax or interest effects divided by the number of shares outstanding 
for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude expenses related to tax or interest 
effects, coded as 0. FLj,t is the actual losses on foreign exchange divided by the number 
of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude losses on 
foreign exchange, coded as 0. Equityj,t is the actual figures of charges or costs on equity 
accounting divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those 
firms that do not exclude charges or costs on equity accounting, coded as 0. For 
compliance firms, Otherj,t includes the costs (e.g., legal costs, Australasia insurance 
costs, guarantee and commitment fees, losses of natural disasters) that are not classified 
in any of the seven specific categories mentioned above. For non-compliance firms, 
Otherj,t is more ambiguous because the firms do not state what the other expenses are; 
therefore, we measure Otherj,t for non-compliance firms as the total income-increasing 
exclusions minus any of the other seven individual adjustments divided by the number 
of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t; for those firms that do not present any 
adjustments, Otherj,t equals the total income-increasing adjustments divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t.   
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3.4. Control Variables for H1 and H2 
Several control variables from the findings of previous studies are included in 
the tests. Leveragej,t is measured by short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets for firm j, in year t (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Doukakis, 2014; Francis 
and Wang, 2008). Firm growth is measured by the market-to-book ratio (MtoBj,t) and 
sales growth (SalesGj,t) (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Doyle et al., 2013; Black et 
al., 2017; Zang, 2012). In that, MtoBj,t is measured by the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity for firm j, in year t. SalesGj,t is measured by sales 
for firm j, in year t, minus the sales for firm j, in year t-1. This result is then divided by 
the sales for firm j, in year t. Firm profitability is measured by return on equity (ROEj,t) 
(e.g., Doyle et al., 2007a; Doyle et al., 2013; Frankel et al., 2011; Doukakis, 2014). The 
capital intensity (Capitalj,t) measurement is calculated by the ratio of the net book value 
of property, plant, and equipment to total assets for firm j, in year t (e.g., Baginski et al., 
1999; Francis et al., 2004). This study also includes net operating assets at the 
beginning of the year as a control variable because previous net operating assets, which 
indicate balance-sheet constraints, influence current managers’ decisions to use earnings 
management (Badertscher, 2011). Net operating assets (NOAj,t) is measured by 
shareholders’ equity less cash, and cash equivalent, plus total debt divided by lagged 
sales for firm j, at the beginning of the year t. Firm size (Sizej,t) is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets for firm j, at the beginning of year t (Ettredge et al., 
2005; Doukakis, 2014). Following previous studies (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; 
DeFond and Hung, 2003; Dichev and Tang, 2008; Frankel et al., 2011), we also 
included earnings variability (SDEj,t) as a control variable, and measure it as the 
standard deviation of earnings before tax using a five-year rolling window ending in 
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2014 for firm j. 3  This paper includes time and industry effects to control the 
unobservable confounding variables that differ from time to time but are constant across 
industries, as well as unobservable confounding variables that differ across industries 
but are constant over time. 
3.5. Testing Value Relevance of Non-IFRS earnings (H3) 
A frequently used model in value-relevance literature is the model of residual-
income valuation developed by Ohlson (1995) and refined by Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995, 1996). This model links the market values of the equity of a firm to its abnormal 
earnings, net book values, and other information (Barth et al., 2001; Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001). This paper uses Ohlson’s (1995) model to test H3 as follows: 
Stockj,t = a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2NCPLj,t + a3UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t + a4BVEPSj,t + 
a5Controlsj,t+ej,t                                                                                                                                                       (3a) 
Stockj,t = a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2NCPLj,t + a3UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t + a4Missj,t + 
a5UEPSj,t*Missj,t *NCPLj,t + a6BVEPSj,t + a7Controlsj,t+ej,t                                                (3b) 
Stockj,t = a0 + a1UEPSj,t + a2NCPLj,t + a3UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t + a4Lossj,t + 
a5UEPSj,t*Lossj,t *NCPLj,t + a6BVEPSj,t + a7Controlsj,t+ej,t                                                (3c) 
Where j is firm-year observations, and t is the years from 2011 to 2014. Stockj,t is the 
stock price for firm j, in year t, on the date of the earnings announcement. UEPSj,t is the 
actual non-IFRS earnings figures for firm j, in year t. NCPLj,t is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if firm j does not comply with ASIC guidelines in reporting non-IFRS earnings 
in year t, and 0 otherwise. UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t is an interaction term between UEPSj,t and 
																																																								
3	This is a five-year rolling window for each firm, ending in 2014. Specifically, obtaining the data of SDEj,t in 2011 
requires data of earnings before tax from 2007 to 2011; obtaining data of SDEj,t in 2012 requires data of earnings 
before tax from 2008 to 2012. The same rolling process has been applied for other years and ends in 2014 for firm j.		
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NCPLj,t. BVEPSj,t is the book value divided by the number of shares outstanding for 
firm j, in year t. Missj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j’s earnings before tax 
in year t are less than earnings before tax in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Lossj,t is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j made IFRS losses in year t, and zero otherwise. 
UEPSj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t is the interaction term between UEPSj,t, Missj,t,and NCPLj,t. 
UEPSj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t is the interaction term between UEPSj,t, Lossj,t,and NCPLj,t. For 
equations (3b) and (3c), we only include observations where firms exclude income-
increasing non–IFRS earnings adjustments, as we are also interested in investigating the 
value relevance of non-IFRS earnings under opportunistic reporting. Equation (3) also 
includes the time and industry effects to control the unobservable confounding variables 
that differ from time to time but are constant across the industries, as well as the 
unobservable confounding variables that differ across industries but are constant over 
time. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Sample 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables for the hypotheses. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for non-IFRS 
earnings reporting. We present the descriptive statistics for two sub-samples for 
comparison: the firm-year observations of the firms that do not comply with ASIC 
guidelines (i.e., non-compliance firms) and the firm-year observations of the firms that 
comply with ASIC guidelines (i.e., compliance firms).  
Non-compliance firms reported higher non-IFRS earnings figures compared 
with compliance firms (t = 2.021, p-value = 0.044). The mean of stock price (Stockj,t) is 
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lower for ASIC non-compliance firms than for ASIC compliance firms (t = -1.780, p-
value = 0.076). Compared with ASIC compliance firms, ASIC non-compliance firms 
are those with a lower market-to-book ratio (t = -1.896, p-value = 0.059), with higher 
rates of sales growth (t = 2.899, p-value = 0.004), with a smaller firm size (t = -4.813, p-
value = 0.000), with higher leverage ratios (t = 1.930, p-value = 0.054), with lower 
returns on equity (t = -2.713, p-value = 0.007), with higher previous-year operating net 
assets (t = 2.167, p = 0.031), with less intensive capital (t = -2.375, p = 0.018), and with 
higher earnings variability (t = 2.693, p-value = 0.008).  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for income-
increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments. Compared with ASIC compliance firms, 
ASIC non-compliance firms present more total adjustments (t = 2.017, p-value = 0.044). 
Examining individual adjustments, ASIC non-compliance firms excluded more 
expenses related to tax or interest effects (t = 1.687, p-value = 0.093), losses on foreign 
exchange (t = 1.870, p-value = 0.065), charges or costs on equity accounting (t = 2.261, 
p-value = 0.027), and other unspecific adjustments (t = 6.833, p-value = 0.000), while 
ASIC compliance firms excluded more losses on asset dispositions or investments (t = -
1.799, p-value = 0.075) and on redundancies or restructuring costs (t = -1.713, p-
value = 0.088). 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
4.2. Pearson and Spearman Correlations  
Given that multicollinearity between variables is a potential concern in 
multivariate analysis, this study employs Pearson and Spearman correlations for the 
variables of interest and control variables of the sample, as presented in Table 3.  
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Panel A of Table 3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the 
variables of non-IFRS earnings reporting, with the results demonstrating that ADJj,t is 
positively correlated to Missj,t and positively correlated to Lossj,t under the Spearman 
and Pearson correlations. These findings suggest that when IFRS earnings fail to meet 
IFRS earnings targets or firms make current IFRS losses, they use income-increasing 
non-IFRS earnings adjustments to make non-IFRS earnings more profitable. Panel B of 
Table 3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the variables of income-
increasing exclusions. As presented in Panel B of Table 3, most of the individual 
income-increasing adjustments and total income-increasing adjustments positively 
correlate with each other under the Pearson and Spearman correlations. 
Previous research argues that multicollinearity becomes a serious problem when 
correlations exceed 0.8 (e.g., Li and Mangena, 2014; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The 
correlation of each variable here is less than 0.8, suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
a major problem for the variables in this study. We also consider variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to determine whether there are any multicollinearity issues in addition to 
using correlations. The results demonstrate that none of the VIFs are greater than 3. The 
results are presented in the notes of the tables presenting the regression results.  
  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
4.3. Results for H1 
Table 4 presents the regression results for H1 analyzed using the time–industry 
fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The results demonstrate that ADJj,t is 
negatively but statistically insignificantly related to Missj,t (coefficient = -0.050, t-
value = -0.550) and Lossj,t (coefficient = -0.176, t-value = -1.190), suggesting that for 
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ASIC compliance firms (i.e., NCPL = 0), even if firms do not meet their earnings 
targets or make losses, managers do not use income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments to report non-IFRS earnings as higher than current IFRS earnings. ADJj,t is 
significantly and positively associated with Missj,t*NCPLj,t (coefficient = 0.223, t-
value = 1.800) and Lossj,t*NCPLj,t (coefficient = 0.938, t-value = 8.750), suggesting that 
for ASIC non-compliance firms, if firms miss their earnings targets or make losses, 
managers exclude expenses to achieve greater income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments than do compliance firms to report non-IFRS earnings as higher than the 
current IFRS earnings.  
The results for the control variables indicate that less mature (Capitalj,t, 
coefficient = -0.071, t-value = -1.770), less profitable firms (ROEj,t, coefficient = -
0.371, t-value = -3.650) make income-increasing adjustments using expenses to arrive 
at non-IFRS earnings. This behavior may be attributed to the fact that the growth of less 
mature, less profitable firms lags behind the growth of their more mature competitors, 
and that these firms feel the need to manage earnings perceptions using income-
increasing adjustments.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
4.4. Results for H2  
Table 5 presents the results for the persistence of income-increasing non-IFRS 
earnings adjustments (H2a) using time–industry fixed-effects OLS regression. The first, 
second, and third models that tested H2a present the results with OEj,t+1 as the dependent 
variable. The fourth, fifth, and sixth models that tested H2a present the results with 
OEj,∑t+1to2 as the dependent variable.  
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            The results demonstrate that ADJj,t is not significantly associated with OEj,t+1 nor 
OEj,∑t+1to2. The interaction term ADJj,t*NCPLj,t is significantly and negatively 
associated with OEj,t+1 (coefficient = -0.256, t-value = -3.040) in the first model and to 
OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.598, t-value = -2.910) in the fourth model, suggesting one 
dollar of expense included in the total income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments by non-compliance firms implies one-year-ahead operating expenses of 
A$0.261 (i.e., coefficient of ADJj,t*NCPLj,t on OEj,t+1 [-0.256] plus coefficient of ADJj,t 
on OEj,t+1 [-0.005]) and future operating expenses over the subsequent two years of 
A$0.599 (i.e., coefficient of ADJj,t*NCPLj,t on OEj,∑t+1to2 [-0.598] plus coefficient of 
ADJj,t on OEj,∑t+1to2 [-0.001]). The results for the relationship between ADJj,t*NCPLj,t 
and future operating earnings (i.e., OEj,t+1 and OEj,∑t+1to2) for the other models are 
similar to the results for the first and fourth models, as described above. 
 The results also show that ADJj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t is significantly and negatively 
related to OEj,t+1 (coefficient = -0.016, t-value = -3.980) in the second model and to 
OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.060, t-value = -3.270) in the fifth model. 
ADJj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t is significantly and negatively related to OEj,t+1 (coefficient = 
−0.096, t value = −2.180) in the third model and to OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = −0.103, t 
value = −3.020) in the sixth model that are both used to test H2a. The results indicate 
that when non-compliance firms include one dollar of expense in the total income-
increasing non–IFRS earnings adjustments, the one-year-ahead operating expenses and 
future operating expenses over the subsequent two years of firms that miss the IFRS 
earnings target would exceed that of firms that meet the IFRS earnings target by 
A$0.016 and A$0.06, respectively. Further, on such inclusion of one dollar of expense, 
the one-year-ahead operating expenses and future operating expenses over the 
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subsequent two years of non-compliance firms that incur IFRS losses would exceed that 
of non-compliance firms that earn IFRS profits by A$0.096 and A$0.103, respectively. 
Collectively, the results presented in Table 5 indicate that the income-increasing 
non-IFRS earnings adjustments excluded by non-compliance firms are persistent into 
future earnings, suggesting that the income-increasing adjustments made by non-
compliance firms are not one-off items.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Table 6 presents the results for H2b using eight individual adjustments as the 
independent variables. To test H2b, we examine two sub-samples to understand how 
reported individual income-increasing adjustments differ between compliance firms and 
non-compliance firms. The first and second models in testing H2b present the results for 
H2b using eight individual income-increasing adjustments as independent variables and 
future operating earnings as the dependent variables for a sample of non-compliance 
firms, while we also present the results for H2b using eight individual income-
increasing adjustments as independent variables and future operating earnings as 
dependent variables for a sample of compliance firms. The first and second models of 
Table 6 demonstrate that for the sample of ASIC non-compliance firms, FLj,t is weakly 
significantly and negatively associated with OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.005, t-value = -
1.810), Equityj,t is significantly and negatively associated with OEj,t+1 (coefficient = -
0.017, t-value = -2.040) and with OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.061, t-value = -2.220), 
Otherj,t is significantly and negatively associated with OEj,t+1 (coefficient = -0.034, t-
value = -3.210) and with OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.168, p-value = -3.830). The results 
mean that one dollar of expense included in the “losses on foreign exchange” category 
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of income-increasing non-IFRS earnings exclusions implies two-year-ahead operating 
expenses of A$0.005; one dollar of expense included in the category of “charges or 
costs on equity accounting” of income-increasing non-IFRS earnings exclusions implies 
one-year-ahead operating expenses of A$0.017, and future operating expenses over the 
subsequent two years of A$0.061; one dollar of expense included in the “other” 
category of income-increasing non-IFRS earnings exclusions implies one-year-ahead 
operating expenses of A$0.034, and future operating expenses over the subsequent two 
years of A$0.168. As shown in Table 6, the third and fourth models demonstrate that for 
firms complying with the ASIC guidelines, none of the individual adjustments is 
significantly related to future operating earnings except “other”. Otherj,t is weakly 
significantly and negatively associated with OEj,t+1 (coefficient = -0.029, t-value = -
1.810) and with OEj,∑t+1to2 (coefficient = -0.026, t-value = -1.660). 
The results presented in Table 6 combined with the results presented in Table 5 
suggest that ASIC non-compliance firms opportunistically exclude recurring expenses 
from IFRS earnings and categorize them as “losses on foreign exchange,” “charges or 
costs on equity accounting,” and “other” in the non-IFRS earnings calculation schedule 
to make non-IFRS earnings appear more profitable than IFRS earnings. The category of 
“other” is particularly ambiguous, which means that its composition is less likely to be 
detected by investors. Unlike with non-compliance firms, most income-increasing 
adjustments made by ASIC compliance firms do not persist into future operating 
earnings, suggesting that ASIC compliance firms disclose non-IFRS earnings faithfully. 
 




4.5. Results for H3 
Table 7 provides the results of the time–industry fixed-effects OLS regressions 
for value relevance (H3). The first model that tested H3 presents the result 
demonstrating that UEPSj,t is significantly and positively associated with Stockj,t 
(coefficient = 0.615, t-value = 6.230). The first model also finds that UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t is 
significantly and negatively associated with Stockj,t (coefficient = -0.179, t-value = -
4.840). The coefficient on non-IFRS earnings is 0.615 for the firm that complies with 
ASIC guidelines (NCPL = 0), and 0.436 (0.615-0.179) for the firm that does not comply 
with ASIC guidelines (NCPL = 1); a decrease of 29%. The results indicate that, on 
average, the market perceives non-IFRS earnings reported by non-compliance firms as 
less value relevant than the non-IFRS earnings reported by compliance firms. In the 
second model that tested H3, on limiting the sample to the observations where the firms 
applied income-increasing non-IFRS earnings and introducing Missj,t and Lossj,t with 
their interaction terms UEPSj,t*Missj,t *NCPLj,t and UEPSj,t*Lossj,t *NCPLj,t, the results 
changed as follows: UEPSj,t coefficient is significantly and positively associated with 
Stockj,t (coefficient = 0.643, t-value = 6.920); UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t is not significantly 
associated with Stockj,t; and UEPSj,t*Missj,t *NCPLj,t is significantly and positively 
associated with Stockj,t (coefficient = 0.122, t value = 2.940).  Similar results have been 
found in the third model where: UEPSj,t coefficient is significantly and positively 
associated with Stockj,t (coefficient = 0.631, t-value = 7.350); UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t is weakly 
significantly and negatively associated with Stockj,t (coefficient = -0.189, t-value = -
1.720); UEPSj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t is significantly and positively associated with Stockj,t 
(coefficient = 0.341, t-value = 3.990). The results illustrate that when firms miss IFRS 
earnings target or incur IFRS losses, the application of income-increasing non–IFRS 
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earnings adjustments made by non-compliance firms lead investors to believe the non-
IFRS earnings are more value relevant than non-IFRS earnings reported by compliance 
firms. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
     
      Studies on countries such as the United States where compliance with reporting 
standards on non-GAAP earnings is compulsory reveal that compulsory introduction of 
non-GAAP guidelines can significantly increase the reporting quality of non–GAAP 
earnings and decreases opportunistic non-GAAP reporting (Bowen et al., 2005) and 
misleading reporting practices (Entwistle et al., 2006). Further, the probability that firms 
disclose non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat forecasts declines (Heflin and Hsu, 2008) 
and confidence in the market increases (Marques, 2006). However, our study finds that 
although ASIC has issued guidelines to limit firms’ opportunistic non–IFRS earnings 
reporting, following these guidelines is not mandatory for reporting firms. Such 
reporting is still present in non-compliance firms and investors are misled by these 





5. Additional Tests 
5.1 The effect of income-decreasing exclusions on future operating earnings 
To address whether income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments have any 
effect on future operating earnings, this study conducted an additional test to re-examine 
H2a by replacing income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments with income-
decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments. In particular, DeADJj,t represents total 
actual income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments divided by the number of 
shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. It is calculated as the actual non-IFRS earnings 
figures minus the IFRS earnings figures divided by the number of shares outstanding 
for firm j, in year t. For this test, we keep negative adjustments and set positive 
adjustments as 0, and take the absolute value of income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments. The results are presented in Table 8. The analysis demonstrates that 
DeADJj,t and DeADJj,t*NCPLj,t are positively but not significantly associated with 
future operating earnings. The positive relationship suggests that firms that report non-
IFRS earnings as lower than IFRS earnings tend to exclude recurring revenues to make 
non-IFRS earnings lower than IFRS earnings. However, the relationship is insignificant, 
which we consider is because of the limited observations (there are only 79 of 407 
observations that reported non-IFRS earnings lower than IFRS earnings; seven of 407 
observations that reported non-IFRS earnings equal to IFRS earnings). The results of 
this test provide an avenue for future study to extend the sample size and examine 
managers’ incentives to exclude income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments and 
individual income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments.  
 




5.2 Change of earnings targets 
             In this study, current earnings being lower than previous earnings is used as a 
benchmark for opportunism. There are other benchmarks for opportunism, such as 
whether the firm is able to achieve a profit with the non-IFRS earnings, when the IFRS 
earnings as negative. In this section, we re-test our three hypotheses by replacing Missj.t 
with Profitj,t. Profitj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j achieves a profit with 
non-IFRS earnings, when IFRS earnings is negative in year t, and 0 otherwise. The 
results, presented in Table 9, are similar to our main results, suggesting that non-
compliance firms report non-IFRS earnings opportunistically to convert IFRS losses to 
non-IFRS profits. Further, the market perceives opportunistic non–IFRS earnings 
reporting made by non-compliance firms is more value relevant than non-IFRS earnings 
reported by compliance firms.   
<Insert table 9 about here> 
         We acknowledge that meeting analysts’ forecasts is also a commonly used 
benchmark, but compared with their US counterparts, analysts do not follow Australian 
firms intensively (Habib and Hossain, 2008; Lont et al., 2010). Moreover, we had 
limited access to forecast data and propose including this benchmark in a future study.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper examines how ASIC non-IFRS earnings reporting guidelines 
influence the non-IFRS earnings reporting quality in Australian listed firms from 2011 
to 2014. Furthermore, the paper examines how the market reacts to the non-IFRS 
earnings reported by ASIC compliance firms versus its reaction to the non-IFRS 
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earnings reported by ASIC non-compliance firms, when there is presence of 
opportunistic non-IFRS earnings practice.  
For ASIC non-compliance firms, this study finds that missing earnings targets or 
making current losses leads such firms to exclude income-increasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments to report non-IFRS earnings higher than IFRS earnings. In addition, this 
study finds that the income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments excluded by non-
compliance firms are persistent into future operating earnings and that such firms 
categorize these recurring expenses as “losses on foreign exchange,” “charges or costs 
on equity accounting,” and “other expenses”. We find that most income-increasing 
adjustments are non-recurring and unimportant for ASIC compliance firms, suggesting 
that these firms attempt to act as responsible reporters by signaling non-IFRS earnings 
in a responsible manner to demonstrate that they use discretion judiciously to inform 
investors. We also find that the market perceives non-IFRS earnings reported by ASIC 
non-compliance firms to be more value relevant than the non-IFRS earnings reported by 
ASIC compliance firms, in the presence of opportunistic non–IFRS earnings reporting. 
 
Three study limitations should be considered when interpreting our results. First, 
like other empirical research, our results may suffer from endogeneity problems. 
Although we use models of time–industry effects to control for the unobservable 
confounding variables that differ from time to time, as well as unobservable 
confounding variables that differ across industries, we cannot fully control for all other 
unobservable variables that influence explanatory variables. Second, we investigated 
only the ASX 200 listed Australian firms. Generalizing these results to other countries 
requires future research. Third, we focused only on managers’ motivation to report 
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income-increasing non-IFRS earnings when firms miss earnings targets, make current 
losses, and convert IFRS losses to non-IFRS profits, and future research could examine 
other managers’ motivation to report income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings 
adjustments, such as whether firms report income-increasing non-IFRS earnings to meet 
analyst forecast in Australia. Future research should evaluate the effects of managerial 
risk undertaken in such reporting or the influence of managers’ compensation on the 
level of non-IFRS earnings reporting. We propose that future research should also 
examine whether managers’ incentives affect when and how they report non-IFRS 
earnings.  
The findings of this paper enrich the literature on current voluntary disclosure in 
non-IFRS earnings reporting in a voluntary-reporting setting and pave the way to update 
financial-reporting policies using empirical evidence related to non-IFRS earnings 
reporting. Compared with the findings in the countries where compliance with non-
GAAP earnings is compulsory (e.g., the US), which generally suggest that compulsory 
introduction of non-GAAP guidelines can increase the quality of non–GAAP earnings 
reporting (see Bowen et al., 2005; Entwistle et al., 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; 
Marques, 2006), our study finds that although ASIC has issued guidelines to limit 
firms’ opportunistic non–IFRS earnings reporting, following these guidelines is 
voluntary for reporting firms. Opportunistic non–IFRS earnings reporting is still present 
in non-compliance firms and investors are misled by such reporting practices into 
believing that opportunistic non-IFRS earnings are value relevant. Hence, regulators 
should consider the practices of these firms when designing policies related to reporting 
non-IFRS earnings. We suggest mandatorily enforcing the guidelines on non–IFRS 
earnings reporting firms to mitigate such opportunistic reporting. When possible, ASIC 
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should increase its enforcement action against firms that do not comply with these 
guidelines. Our findings would help the government in undertaking law reforms to 
ensure that firms that do not comply with ASIC guidelines do so or face legal action if 
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Table 1: Sample selection 
Sample selection 
 Number of firms Firm-year observations 
Top ASX200 firms 200 800 
Exclusions:   
Banks 6 24 
Insurance 4 16 
Diversified financials 9 36 
Real estate 19 76 
Missing data 10 404 
Final group investigated 152 608 
Non-IFRS earnings reporting 131 407 
Reported non-IFRS earnings 
are greater than statutory 
earnings (i.e., income-






















4	This paper has deleted the firms that do not have annual reports over four years. They are Aurizon Holdings Limited; Carsales. 
Com Limited; Echo Entertainment Group Limited; Maverick Drilling and Exploration Limited; Treasury Wine Estates Limited; 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for non-IFRS earnings reporting variables  
Table 2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for non-IFRS earnings reporting variables  





Variables Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev t p-value 
Stockj,t 3.295 1.091 3.209 1.162 3.399 0.991 -1.780* 0.076 
UEPSj,t 1.264 0.924 1.347 0.973 1.164 0.853 2.021** 0.044 
MtoBj,t 2.842 2.777 2.612 3.094 3.121 2.315 -1.896* 0.059 
ROEj,t 0.136 0.296 0.101 0.318 0.179 0.262 -2.713*** 0.007 
SDEj,t 0.121 0.250 0.149 0.317 0.087 0.121 2.693*** 0.008 
Leveragej,t 0.313 0.324 0.341 0.297 0.278 0.351 1.930* 0.054 
NOAj,t 0.801 0.660 0.863 0.736 0.725 0.547 2.167** 0.031 
Sizej,t 7.663 1.626 7.325 1.702 8.072 1.429 -4.813*** 0.000 
Capitalj,t 3.893 0.901 3.797 0.871 4.010 0.924 -2.375** 0.018 
SalesGj,t 0.119 0.275 0.154 0.283 0.076 0.259 2.899*** 0.004 
 
Table 2 Panel B: Descriptive statistics for individual adjustments  
		 Full sample Non-compliance  Compliance T-test 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. t p-value 
ADJj,t 407 0.305 0.442 223 0.334 0.494 184 0.248 0.365 2.017** 0.044 
IAj,t 204 0.125 0.293 106 0.151 0.387 98 0.097 0.128 1.359 0.177 
LAj,t 134 0.097 0.202 63 0.063 0.246 71 0.127 0.247 -1.799* 0.075 
RCj,t 153 0.135 0.369 85 0.091 0.421 68 0.189 0.284 -1.713* 0.088 
MACj,t 90 0.179 0.368 31 0.156 0.261 59 0.192 0.415 -0.503 0.616 
TIj,t 154 0.049 0.248 87 0.077 0.285 67 0.013 0.184 1.687* 0.093 
FLj,t 81 0.099 0.103 43 0.122 0.119 38 0.079 0.087 1.870* 0.065 
Equityj,t 98 0.068 0.269 61 0.107 0.326 37 0.005 0.104 2.261** 0.027 
Otherj,t 214 0.211 0.391 153 0.289 0.428 61 0.016 0.156 6.833*** 0.000 






















Table 3: Pearson and Spearman correlations for sample variables 
Pearson  
Table 3 Panel A: Pearson and Spearman correlations for the variables of opportunistic reporting hypothesis (407 firm-year observations) 




UEPSj,t 1.000 0.542*** 0.198* 0.219*** -0.203*** 0.034 -0.304*** -0.109*** 0.156*** 0.106** -0.081* 0.453*** 
  (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.056) (0.000) 
ADJj,t 0.541*** 1.000 0.132* 0.195*** -0.189*** 0.043 -0.294*** -0.099** 0.159*** 0.098** -0.079* 0.436*** 
 (0.000)  (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.019) (0.064) (0.000) 
Missj,t 0.208** 0.132* 1.000 0.312*** 0.069 -0.043 -0.103** -0.336*** 0.015 -0.063 -0.187*** 0.027 
 (0.043) (0.064)  (0.000) (0.104) (0.316) (0.016) (0.000) (0.724) (0.135) (0.000) (0.532) 
Lossj,t 0.225*** 0.200*** 0.312*** 1.000 0.281*** -0.065 0.143*** -0.136*** 0.087** -0.069* -0.389*** -0.330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.126) (0.001) (0.001) (0.041) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) 
SDEj,t -0.322*** -0.305*** 0.087** 0.321*** 1.000 0.007 0.236*** 0.037 -0.212*** 0.064 -0.132*** -0.361*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000)  (0.863) (0.000) (0.379) (0.000) (0.126) (0.002) (0.000) 
NOAj,t 0.027 0.041 -0.010 -0.092** 0.032 1.000 -0.152*** 0.068 0.172*** 0.088** -0.087** 0.067 
 (0.528) (0.333) (0.809) (0.029) (0.450)  (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.038) (0.038) (0.116) 
MtoBj,t -0.304*** -0.297*** -0.105** 0.127*** 0.266*** -0.197*** 1.000 0.094** -0.562*** -0.055 0.196*** -0.445*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.027) (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) (0.000) 
SalesGj,t -0.126*** -0.119*** -0.448*** -0.196*** 0.091** 0.065 0.168*** 1.000 -0.072* 0.121*** 0.125*** -0.208*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.128) (0.000)  (0.091) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
Capitalj,t 0.225*** 0.220*** 0.011 0.083* -0.241*** 0.220*** -0.700*** -0.143*** 1.000 -0.063 -0.315*** 0.253*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.800) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.140) (0.000) (0.000) Leveragej
,t  
0.204*** 0.185*** -0.048 -0.211*** -0.390*** 0.245*** -0.138*** 0.077* 0.061 1.000 -0.003 0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.257) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.071) (0.152)  (0.948) (0.003) 
ROEj,t -0.308*** -0.552*** 0.030 0.024 -0.131*** -0.106** 0.398*** 0.288*** -0.485*** 0.088** 1.000 0.101** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.474) (0.579) (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037)  (0.018) 
Sizej,t 0.473*** 0.455*** 0.045 -0.266*** -0.474*** 0.046 -0.424*** -0.180*** 0.353*** 0.340*** -0.056 1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.291) (0.000) (0.000) (0.276) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.185)            Spearman 
 Pearson   
          
Table 3 Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlations for the variables of individual adjustments  
 ADJj,t IAj,t LAj,t RCj,t MACj,t TIj,t FLj,t Equityj,t Otherj,t 
ADJj,t 1.000 0.421*** 0.162*** 0.303*** 0.676*** 0.302*** 0.198*** 0.247*** 0.445*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAj,t 0.414*** 1.000 0.333*** 0.345*** 0.137*** 0.391*** 0.269*** 0.226*** 0.399*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAj,t 0.159*** 0.413*** 1.000 0.284*** 0.259*** 0.217*** 0.133 0.356*** 0.227*** 
 (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.565) (0.000) (0.000) 
RCj,t 0.307*** 0.367*** 0.242*** 1.000 0.341*** 0.248*** 0.103 0.406*** 0.559*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.487) (0.000) (0.000) 
MACj,t 0.164*** 0.111** 0.209*** 0.289*** 1.000 0.397*** -0.027 0.223*** 0.273*** 
 (0.004) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.633) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIj,t 0.261*** 0.355*** 0.344*** 0.198*** 0.333*** 1.000 0.280*** 0.050 0.239*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.379) (0.000) 
FLj,t 0.169*** 0.216*** 0.150*** 0.107* -0.047 0.192*** 1.000 -0.045 0.306*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.057) (0.408) (0.001)  (0.427) (0.000) 
Equityj,t 0.130** 0.237*** 0.221*** 0.206*** 0.115** 0.129** 0.094* 1.000 0.338*** 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.022) (0.097)  (0.000) 
Otherj,t 0.452*** 0.358*** 0.175*** 0.303*** 0.110** 0.152*** 0.162*** 0.202*** 1.000 
  (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.050) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000)  
                                                                                                                                                                                              Spearman 
Note: p statistics in parentheses 
  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 








Table 4: Regression results for opportunism reporting (H1) 
ADJj,t as dependent variable (Equation 1) 
	 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Missj,t -0.050 0.091 -0.550 0.584 
Lossj,t -0.176 0.148 -1.190 0.236 
NCPLj,t 0.062** 0.028 2.240 0.026 
Missj,t*NCPLj,t 0.223* 0.124 1.800 0.072 
Lossj,t*NCPLj,t 0.938*** 0.107 8.750 0.000 
Capitalj,t -0.071* 0.040 -1.770 0.077 
Sizej,t -0.011 0.019 -0.550 0.581 
Leveragej,t 0.072 0.104 0.690 0.487 
SalesGj,t 0.193* 0.116 1.660 0.097 
MtoBj,t 0.009 0.042 0.220 0.823 
ROEj,t -0.371*** 0.102 -3.650 0.000 
SDEj,t 0.064 0.121 0.530 0.596 
NOAj,t -0.051 0.043 -1.170 0.242 
_cons 0.315 0.245 1.290 0.199 
Time effects YES 
	 	 	Industry effects YES 
	 	 	Number of obs. 407 
	 	 	Adjusted R-squared  24.48%    


























Table 5: Regression results for persistence of adjustments (H2a) 
 OEj,t+1 as dependent variable  OEj,∑t+1to2 as dependent variable  
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (Equation 2ai) (Equation 2aii) (Equation 2aiii) (Equation 2a iv) (Equation 2a v) (Equation 2a vi) 
UEPSj,t 0.240*** 0.275*** 0.282*** 0.596*** 0.442** 0.433** 
	 (3.330) (2.620) (2.670) (3.660) (2.280) (2.340) 
ADJj,t -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.043 -0.025 
	 (-0.060) (-0.040) (-0.030) (-0.010) (-0.150) (-0.090) 
NCPLj,t 0.046 0.024 0.038 0.001 0.034 0.012 
	 (0.450) (0.230) (0.380) (0.010) (0.180) (0.060) 
ADJj,t*NCPLj,t -0.256*** -0.265*** -0.255*** -0.598*** -0.553** -0.542** 
	 (-3.040) (-3.130) (-3.070) (-2.910) (-2.320) (-2.280) 





































Capitalj,t 0.112** 0.110** 0.113** 0.226*** 0.223*** 0.228*** 
	 (2.490) (2.430) (2.520) (2.730) (2.680) (2.750) 
Sizej,t -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.177*** 
	 (-3.270) (-3.270) (-3.360) (-3.800) (-3.800) (-3.880) 
Leveragej,t 0.535*** 0.535*** 0.535*** 1.056*** 1.059*** 1.055*** 
	 -4.080 -4.080 -4.080 -4.390 -4.390 -4.380 
SalesGj,t 0.039 0.021 0.021 0.107 0.194 0.138 
	 (0.280) (0.140) (0.150) (0.420) (0.720) (0.540) 
MtoBj,t -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.032 -0.032* -0.031 
	 (-0.640) (-0.690) (-0.590) (-1.630) (-1.670) (-1.580) 
ROEj,t 0.547*** 0.527*** 0.516*** 1.161*** 1.132*** 1.108*** 
	 (4.380) (4.180) (4.000) (5.060) (4.880) (4.670) 
SDEj,t -1.631*** -1.620*** -1.617*** -2.236*** -2.220*** -2.211*** 
	 (-10.830) (-10.750) (-10.670) (-8.090) (-8.010) (-7.950) 
NOAj,t 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.111 0.110 0.111 
	 (0.840) (0.830) (0.840) (1.120) (1.110) (1.120) 
_cons 0.133 0.208 0.171 0.373 0.484 0.439 
	 (0.510) (0.780) (0.650) (0.780) (0.990) (0.910) 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs. 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Adjusted R-
squared  21.75% 21.77% 21.63% 16.04% 15.98% 15.88% 





Table 6: Regression results for persistence of individual adjustments (H2b) 
   Non-compliance firms Compliance firms 
		 OEj,t+1 as dependent variable 
OEj,∑t+1to2 as dependent 
variable  
OEj,t+1 as dependent 
variable  
OEj,∑t+1to2 as dependent 
variable  
		 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
	 (Equation 2bi) (Equation 2bii) (Equation 2bi)   (Equation 2bii) 
UEPSj,t 0.263*** 0.272*** 0.249*** 0.300*** 
 (5.510) (7.270) (8.150) (9.010) 
IAj,t -0.012 -0.010 0.008 0.008 
 (-0.580) (-0.620) (0.600) (0.580) 
LAj,t -0.016 0.001 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-0.670) (0.080) (-0.680) (-0.510) 
MACj,t -0.026 -0.016 0.003 0.006 
 (-1.020) (-0.800) (0.180) (0.370) 
RCj,t -0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.015 
 (-0.320) (-0.350) (-1.240) (-1.090) 
TIj,t -0.006 0.006 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-0.280) (0.340) (-0.310) (-0.500) 
FLj,t 0.019 -0.005* 0.024 0.016 
 (0.920) (-1.810) (1.380) (0.930) 
Equityj,t -0.017** -0.061** -0.018 -0.014 
 (-2.040) (-2.220) (-0.910) (-0.730) 
Otherj,t -0.034*** -0.168*** -0.029* -0.026* 
 (-3.210) (-3.830) (-1.810) (-1.660) 
MtoBj,t 0.074** 0.012 0.057** 0.049* 
 (2.460) (0.630) (2.080) (1.800) 
Sizej,t -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (-5.390) (-5.240) (-5.150) (-4.930) 
Leveragej,t 0.259*** 0.239*** 0.166*** 0.160*** 
 (8.700) (10.260) (8.730) (8.580) 
ROEj,t 0.117 0.049*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 
 (1.370) (4.100) (3.850) (3.730) 
SalesGj,t 0.033** 0.038** 0.021** 0.022** 
 (2.230) (2.010) (2.400) (2.580) 
Capitalj,t -0.005 -0.003 -0.012 0.102*** 
 (-0.240) (-0.220) (-0.600) (3.520) 
NOAj,t -0.027** -0.034 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-2.300) (-1.440) (-0.220) (-0.180) 
SDEj,t -0.209*** -0.255 -0.203*** -0.177 
 (-2.780) (-3.350) (-2.780) (-1.150) 
_cons 0.386*** 0.276*** 0.207*** 0.179*** 
 (6.430) (5.970) (5.630) (4.840) 




effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of 
obs. 223 223 184 184 
Adjusted R-
squared  44.71% 54.62% 53.79% 55.71% 





Table 7: Regression results for value relevance (H3) 
 Stockj,t as dependent variable  
Stockj,t as dependent variable 
with income-increasing 
exclusions only 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (Equation 3a) (Equation 3b) (Equation 3c) 
UEPSj,t 0.615*** 0.643*** 0.631*** 
 (6.230) (6.920) (7.350) 
NCPLj,t 0.470*** 0.500*** 0.402*** 
 (2.920) (3.270) (2.790) 
UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t -0.179*** -0.175 -0.189* 






 UEPSj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t 0.122*** 
 
  (2.940) 
 Lossj,t   -0.511
*** 
 
  (-6.470) 
UEPSj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t  0.341
*** 
   (3.990) 
BVEPSj,t 0.136** 0.106* 0.095* 
 (2.610) (1.910) (1.800) 
_cons -2.849*** -2.656*** -2.637*** 
 (-16.390) (-14.820) (-16.470) 
Time effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Number of obs. 407 321 321 
Adjusted R-
squared  45.01% 57.44% 58.27% 
 Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Variables are defined in Appendix. The mean of VIF is between 


















Table 8: Regression results for additional test (the impact of income-decreasing 
exclusions on future operating earnings) 
 H2ai with OEj,t+1 as dependent variable  H2aii with OEj,∑t+1to2 as dependent variable 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
UEPSj,t 0.235*** 0.083 2.880 0.004 0.587*** 0.163 3.180 0.000 
DeADJj,t 0.002 0.071 0.030 0.977 0.027 0.131 0.200 0.838 
NCPLj,t 0.045 0.101 0.440 0.632 0.001 0.185 0.010 0.965 
DeADJj,t*NCP
Lj,t 
0.048 0.107 0.450 0.653 0.062 0.197 0.320 0.753 
Capitalj,t 0.111** 0.045 2.460 0.014 0.226*** 0.083 2.720 0.007 
Sizej,t -0.081*** 0.025 -3.280 0.001 -0.173*** 0.045 -3.800 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.523*** 0.131 4.000 0.000 1.036*** 0.240 4.320 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.028 0.140 0.200 0.842 -0.134 0.257 -0.520 0.602 
MtoBj,t -0.007 0.011 -0.650 0.513 -0.032 0.019 -1.640 0.102 
ROEj,t 0.550*** 0.125 4.390 0.000 1.168*** 0.230 5.080 0.000 
SDEj,t -1.625*** 0.151 -10.790 0.000 -2.223*** 0.277 -8.040 0.000 
NOAj,t 0.048 0.054 0.890 0.371 0.117 0.099 1.180 0.240 
_cons 0.148 0.260 0.570 0.569 0.396 0.478 0.830 0.408 
Time effects YES    YES    
Industry YES    YES    
Number of 
obs. 407    407    
Adjusted R-
squared  21.67%    15.99%    












Table 9: Regression results for additional test (the impact of other earnings 
benchmark) 
 
Table 9 Panel A: re-test H1 by replacing Missj,t with Profitj,t 
		 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Profitj,t -0.137 0.096 -1.420 0.155 
Lossj,t -0.083 0.139 -0.590 0.553 
NCPLj,t 0.062** 0.030 2.090 0.042 
Profitj,t*NCPLj,t 0.363*** 0.084 3.040 0.002 
Lossj,t*NCPLj,t 0.963*** 0.102 9.420 0.000 
Capitalj,t -0.073* 0.040 -1.830 0.068 
Sizej,t -0.002 0.020 -0.090 0.925 
Leveragej,t 0.074 0.105 0.710 0.479 
SalesGj,t 0.146 0.112 1.300 0.193 
MtoBj,t 0.004 0.041 0.090 0.928 
ROEj,t -0.385*** 0.102 -3.780 0.000 
SDEj,t 0.053 0.121 0.430 0.664 
NOAj,t -0.056 0.043 -1.300 0.195 
_cons 0.294 0.242 1.220 0.224 
Time effects YES 
	 	 	Industry effects YES 
	 	 	Number of obs. 407 
	 	 	Adjusted R-squared  24.19% 		 		 		
	
Table 9 Panel B: re-test H2a by replacing Missj,t with Profitj,t 
		 OEj,t+1 as dependent variable  OEj,∑t+1to2 as dependent variable  
		 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
UEPSj,t 0.232*** 0.106 3.680 0.000 0.469** 0.194 2.420 0.016 
ADJj,t 0.027 0.158 0.170 0.865 0.004 0.290 0.010 0.989 
NCPLj,t 0.05 0.101 0.490 0.623 0.007 0.187 0.040 0.971 
ADJj,t*NCPLj,t -0.260*** 0.085 -4.200 0.000 -0.561** 0.195 -2.360 0.018 
Profitj,t -0.122 0.091 -1.340 0.179 -0.181 0.168 -1.080 0.281 
ADJj,t*Profitj,t*NCPLj,t -0.022*** 0.073 -2.950 0.004 -0.093*** 0.054 -3.010 0.003 
Capitalj,t 0.115** 0.045 2.550 0.011 0.231*** 0.083 2.780 0.006 
Sizej,t -0.071*** 0.026 -2.780 0.006 -0.158*** 0.047 -3.350 0.001 
Leveragej,t 0.553*** 0.132 4.200 0.000 1.084*** 0.242 4.480 0.000 
SalesGj,t 0.029 0.139 0.210 0.835 -0.123 0.255 -0.480 0.630 
MtoBj,t -0.008 0.011 -0.720 0.472 -0.033* 0.019 -1.680 0.093 
ROEj,t 0.545*** 0.125 4.360 0.000 1.158*** 0.230 5.040 0.000 
SDEj,t -1.645*** 0.151 -10.900 0.000 -2.257*** 0.277 -8.140 0.000 
NOAj,t 0.041 0.054 0.750 0.452 0.104 0.100 1.050 0.296 
_cons 0.083 0.263 0.320 0.752 0.293 0.485 0.600 0.546 
Time effects YES 
	 	 	
YES 






Number of obs. 407 
	 	 	
407 
	 	 	Adjusted R-squared  21.75% 		 		 		 15.95% 		 		 		
	
Table 9 Panel C: re-test H3 by replacing Missj,t with Profitj,t 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
UEPSj,t 0.615*** 0.099 6.230 0.000 
NCPLj,t 0.454*** 0.161 2.810 0.005 
UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t -0.050 0.079 -0.410 0.685 
Profitj,t 0.228*** 0.154 3.260 0.001 
UEPSj,t*Profitj,t*NCPLj,t 0.106** 0.085 2.500 0.013 
BVEPSj,t 0.135** 0.052 2.590 0.010 
_cons -2.849*** 0.174 -16.390 0.000 
Time effects YES 
   Industry effects YES 
   Number of obs. 321 
   Adjusted R-squared  52.68% 


















































Variables Descriptions  
Missj,t A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j’s earnings before tax in year t is less 
than earnings before tax in year t-1, and zero otherwise 
Lossj,t A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j made IFRS losses in year t, or zero 
otherwise 
UEPSj,t Actual non-IFRS earnings figures that firms report divided by the number of 
shares outstanding for firm j, in year t 
Stockj,t Stock price for firm j, in year t, on the date of the earnings announcement 
Profitj,t Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j’s achieves a profit with the non-IFRS 
earnings, when the IFRS earnings is negative in year t, and zero otherwise 
NCPLj,t A dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if firm j does not comply with ASIC 
guidelines in year t, or ‘0’ otherwise 
ADJj,t Total actual income-increasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. It is calculated as the actual 
non-IFRS earnings figures minus the IFRS earnings figures divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. We keep positive ADJj,t and 
set negative ADJj,t as 0. 
DeADJj,t Total actual income-decreasing non-IFRS earnings adjustments divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. It is calculated as actual non-
IFRS earnings figures minus the IFRS earnings figures divided by the number 
of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t. We keep negative figures and set 
positive figures as ‘0’ 
Missj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between Missj,t and NCPLj,t 
Lossj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between Lossj,t and NCPLj,t 
UEPSj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between UEPSj,t and NCPLj,t 
DeADJj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between DeADJj,t and NCPLj,t 
ADJj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between ADJj,t Missj,t, and NCPLj,t 
ADJj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between ADJj,t Lossj,t, and NCPLj,t 
UEPSj,t*Missj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between UEPSj,t Missj,t,and NCPLj,t 
UEPSj,t*Lossj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between UEPSj,t Lossj,t,and NCPLj,t 
UEPSj,t*Profitj,t*NCPLj,t A interaction term between UEPSj,t Profitj,t,and NCPLj,t 
IAj,t Actual impairment of assets figures divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude impairment 
of assets, coded as 0. 
LAj,t Actual losses on asset dispositions or investment figures divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not 
exclude losses on asset dispositions or investments, coded as 0 
RCj,t Actual redundancies and/or restructuring costs divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude 
redundancies or restructuring costs, coded as 0. 
MACj,t Actual asset merge or demerge and acquisition-transaction costs divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those that firms do not 
exclude asset merge or demerge and acquisition-transaction costs, coded as 0. 
TIj,t Actual figures of expenses related to tax or interest effects divided by the 
number of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not 
exclude expenses related to tax or interest effects, coded as 0. 
FLj,t Actual losses on foreign exchange divided by the number of shares outstanding 
for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude losses on foreign 
exchange, coded as 0 
Equityj,t Actual figures of charges or costs on equity accounting divided by the number 
of shares outstanding for firm j, in year t, for those firms that do not exclude 






Variables (continued)  Descriptions (continued) 
Otherj,t For compliance firms, Otherj,t includes the costs (e.g., legal costs, Australasia 
insurance costs, guarantee and commitment fees, losses of natural disasters, 
etc.) that are not classified in any of the specific categories. For non-
compliance firms, Otherj,t is more ambiguous because the firms do not state 
what the other expenses are; therefore, we measure Otherj,t for non-compliance 
firms as the total income-increasing exclusions minus any of the other seven 
individual adjustments divided by the number of shares outstanding for firm j, 
in year t; for those firms that do not present any adjustments, Otherj,t equals the 
total income-increasing adjustments divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for firm j, in year t. 
MtoBj,t Market-to-book equity ratio for firm j, in year t 
ROEj,t Earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j, in year t 
Sizej,t Natural logarithm of firm j’s total assets, at beginning of year t 
Leveragej,t Short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. 
SDEj,t Standard deviation of earnings before tax scaled by beginning total assets of 
the firm, computed using a 5-year rolling window ending in year 2014 for firm 
j, year t 
NOAj,t Shareholders’ equity less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the 
beginning of the year divided by lagged sales 
SalesGj,t Sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by the 
sales for firm j, year t. 
Capitalj,t Ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets for 
firm j, year t 
BVEPSj,t Book value of equity divided by the number of outstanding shares for firm j, 
year t. 
 
